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COPUOS, UNGA/C  
SUBJECT: DELEGATION GUIDANCE FOR MEETING WITH RUSSIA ON  
SATELLITE COLLISION AND SPACE TCBMS, JUNE 8, 2009

REF: A. STATE 54933  
[1](#)B. MOSCOW 1474  
[1](#)C. STATE 55545

Classified By: C.S. Eliot Kang; 1.4(b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (SBU) BACKGROUND: In 2006 and 2007, Russia and the United States signed military cooperation workplans, which included various space-related activities. To date, none of these activities have occurred. Also in 2007, Russia submitted a list of proposals on space TCBMs to the UN Secretary General. These Russian proposals included information exchanges, familiarization visits, notifications, consultations, and bilateral thematic workshops on space research and use.

[1](#)2. (SBU) On June 2, 2009, the Russian MFA Department for Security and Disarmament (DVBR) responded positively to the U.S. non-paper which invited Russia to preview on June 8 in Vienna (Ref A) our planned presentation regarding the collision of U.S. and Russian satellites and to listen to our ideas on bilateral TCBMs (Ref B). They understood that the United States does not want to link TCBMs to broader questions on the feasibility and desirability of bilateral and multilateral arms control measures for space, in particular to negotiations on proposals such as the Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space Treaty (PPWT).

[1](#)3. (C) This meeting, to be held on the margins of the annual meeting of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) (Ref C) will be an opportunity to discuss proposals we support (e.g., exchanges of information on national security policies and programs, mil-to-mil familiarization visits, and bilateral thematic workshops) and to begin scoping discussions on topics that will require further study by the USG as part of its ongoing space policy review (e.g., exchanges on orbital parameters, notifications, and consultations), which the

Russians indicated an interest in discussing. END  
BACKGROUND.

¶4. (SBU) GUIDANCE: Delegation may draw upon the points in paragraphs 5-10. Delegation also may draw upon the contingency talking points in paragraph 11 on an "if raised" basis.

¶5. (C/Releasable to the Russian Federation): U.S. opening and preliminary points on the collision:

--We appreciate the non-paper and technical information you provided regarding the collision.

--In addition, we welcome Russia's interest in resuming discussions between experts on TCBMs relating to military and other space operations. Such a pragmatic dialogue can provide opportunities for considering the feasibility and desirability of TCBMs for space activities.

--To help improve our mutual understanding of the collision and its implications for the long-term sustainability of the space environment, we are happy to preview the presentations that we will be formally making during the June 9 afternoon session to the COPUOS.

¶6. (SBU) The U.S. Delegation should give a presentation on the February 2009 collision of a U.S. satellite with a Russian satellite, note any response from the Russian Delegation and answer their questions about the presentation.

¶7. (C) Potential questions to be asked by U.S. Delegation based upon the non-paper provided by Russia in March 2009:

-- What space surveillance and space situational awareness capabilities does Russia currently operate/utilize?

-- What are Russia's future plans for their space situational awareness capabilities?

-- Your March 5, 2009 non-paper mentioned the importance of transparency and confidence-building measures in space activities such as the sharing of data related to orbital parameters of space vehicles.

--- The U.S. already shares orbital parameters freely to registered users on the space-track.org website to 37,000 users from 110 nations to promote spaceflight safety.

--- Does Russia intend to share freely in a similar manner or only in bilateral type agreements?

--- Does Russia intend to share information on all satellites or just the collision debris data?

--- What data would Russia be willing to share (two-line element sets, maneuver plans, debris field data, pre-launch parameters, etc.)

-- Your non-paper also stated that Russia would like "consultations regarding ambiguous situations of concern for spacefaring nations."

--- What types of concerns would be considered in this category? Would these situations include emergency notification of a potential conjunction, loss of control of a satellite that is drifting, or orbital debris information?

---- If asked: The U.S. will continue share this data via the space-track.org website or other means, as appropriate.

--- How would Russia like to bring such ambiguous situations to the attention of spacefaring nations? Through what channels (i.e., UN, diplomatic channels)?

-- The U.S. intends to monitor and assess potential collisions for all 800 maneuverable satellites against all other satellites, looking for possible conjunctions. Would Russia like to be notified of any possible conjunctions with your satellites that we predict? Through what channels (i.e., UN, diplomatic channels)?

-- Since we are all concerned with preventing more collisions in space, do you agree that we should focus most closely on this topic area and allow other fora to discuss other issues space matters?

-- The U.S. and Russia are the most capable nations at tracking space objects and are in the best position to predict conjunctions that could have significant impact on

all users of space. What is Russia doing to predict possible conjunctions? Does it intend to notify owner/operators of possible conjunctions?

-- Is Russia willing to engage in bilateral discussions/military-to-military/technical information exchanges/visits regarding space data sharing?

18. (C/Releasable to the Russian Federation) The U.S. Delegation may also provide the following U.S. points on transparency and confidence building measures:

-- The collision serves as a reminder of the need for our two governments to consult on the means for ensuring the continued safe use of space.

-- We hope this discussion will serve as an impetus for additional engagements such as military-to-military familiarization visits, technical information exchanges, and expert level policy discussions that complement our other cooperative efforts to ensure the long-term sustainability of the space environment and to strengthen international security.

-- These additional engagements would complement the bilateral U.S.-Russia Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC) and Pre-Launch Notification System (PLNS), once they are implemented and operational. However, we want to ensure that we avoid duplication in our space security dialogues, as our governments are currently involved in discussing these JDEC and PLNS in separate channels.

-- We may want to consider how our governments might work with other spacefaring nations to develop consensus on pragmatic and voluntary TCBMs that are acceptable to the greatest number of governments.

19. (C) The U.S. delegation is authorized to suggest the following cooperation opportunities (in priority order):

-- A joint study by U.S. and Russian experts on the long-term implications of orbital collisions for human spaceflight safety and other space activities (as noted in the non-paper provided to Russia on June 2, 2009).

-- Collaboration regarding several bilateral TCBMs such as noted in Russias submission of May 11, 2007, to the report of the United Nations Secretary General on "Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities." (UN General Assembly document A/62/114, dated August 3, 2007). These specific TCBMs are:

--- Familiarization visits, which may proceed as soon as possible, in the following priority order:

---- Reciprocal visits by Satellite Movement Control Specialists

---- Reciprocal visits by cadets to Mozhaiski Military Space Academy and the U.S. Air Force Academy

---- Reciprocal visits by space launch operations experts

--- Thematic Workshops, which may commence on or after October 1, 2009:

---- Mil-to-mil Russian-American Military Space Seminar

---- Russian-American Space Security Dialogue involving diplomatic and military experts in space policy and strategy

19. (C) If raised, the U.S. delegation also may agree in principle to include these items, as appropriate, on the agenda for one of the thematic workshops noted in Paragraph 8:

-- Collaboration regarding other bilateral TCBMs based upon those noted in Russia's submission of May 11, 2007, to the report of the United Nations Secretary General on "Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities." (UN General Assembly document A/62/114, dated August 3, 2007).

--- Exchange of information on:

---- The principles and goals of outer space policies of the United States and Russia;

- Major outer space research and use programs;
- Orbital parameters of outer space objects;
- Mechanisms for the notification of:
  - Scheduled spacecraft maneuvers that could result in dangerous proximity to spacecraft of other States;
  - The beginning of descent from orbit of unguided space objects and the predicted impact areas on Earth (taking into account existing Interagency Debris Coordinating Committee procedures for high-risk reentry events);
  - The return from orbit into the atmosphere of a guided spacecraft (taking into account existing Interagency Debris Coordinating Committee procedures for high-risk reentry events);
  - The return of a spacecraft with a nuclear source of power on board, in the case of malfunction and danger of radioactive materials descending to Earth (taking into account Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Space contained in UN General Assembly Resolution 47/68 of December 14, 1992 and the ongoing work of the Joint Experts Group of the COPUOS Science and Technology Subcommittee and the International Atomic Energy Agency).
- Consultations:
  - To clarify the information provided on outer space research and use programs;
  - On activities that could potentially cause harmful interference with the space activities of other nations, as well as on other issues of concern;
  - To discuss the implementation of existing transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities
- Exchange of perspectives on multilateral TCBMs, including:
  - Substantive discussions of proposals in the Conference on Disarmament's working group on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.
  - Joint collaboration with the European Union on proposals for a "Code of Conduct for Space Activities."

¶10. (C) If raised by Russia, the U.S. delegation should not/not agree to include discussions for either bilateral or multilateral notifications of planned spacecraft launches in any thematic workshop on space TCBMs. This topic is already being addressed in ongoing U.S.-Russian discussions on the implementation of the Pre-Launch Notification System and Joint Data Exchange Center.

END GUIDANCE.

¶11. (SBU) BEGIN CONTINGENCY TALKING POINTS:

Space Arms Control:

- Our bilateral and substantive discussions on pragmatic and voluntary TCBMs should proceed without linkage to broader questions on the feasibility and desirability of bilateral and multilateral arms control measures for space.

EU proposed Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities:

- The U.S. intends to play a leading role in advancing TCBMs relating to space activities. TCBMs can help increase transparency regarding governmental space policies, strategies and potentially hazardous activities. This can help to reduce uncertainty over intentions and decrease the risk of misinterpretation or miscalculation in a crisis.
- In this regard, the Administration intends to continue to work closely with our friends and allies in Europe and elsewhere to develop, for the benefit of all nations, voluntary TCBMs that all space-faring nations can support and actively participate in.

U.S. Co-Sponsorship of UN General Assembly Resolution on  
TCBMs:

-- As it did in 2007 and 2008, the United States remains willing to consider co-sponsorship with Russia of a UN General Assembly resolution that would commission a Group of Government Experts study on pragmatic and voluntary TCBMs.

-- Any such draft resolution should reflect the consensus agreement reached in the Conference on Disarmament "to discuss substantively, without limitation, all issues related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space", but without seeking the start of negotiations on proposals such as the Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space Treaty (PPWT) in the Conference on Disarmament or other fora.

END CONTINGENCY TALKING POINTS.  
CLINTON